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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
00HARARE2198
2000-04-21 19:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

211945Z Apr 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3109

PAGE 01        HARARE  02198  01 OF 05  212004Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SMEC-00  DINT-00  DODE-00  
      DOEE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-01   FAAE-00  
      FBIE-00  VC-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     
      AC-01    NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00   
      DSCC-00  DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /010W
                  ------------------4EC111  212007Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5809
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 002198 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD, REASONS 1.5
(B), (D)

REFS: A) HARARE 2102, B) HARARE 2103



1. (C) SUMMARY: ZIMBABWEAN JUSTICE MINISTER AND
MUGABE CONFIDANT STATES THAT THE VICTORIA FALLS
MEETING WAS CALLED IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES
TO CONTINUED FORWARD PROGRESS THAT MIGHT HAVE
RESULTED FROM CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS SINCE THE RECENT
KAMPALA AGREEMENT. ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, HE ASSERTS,
ARE PARTICULARLY EAGER TO FIND A QUICK EXIT FROM THE
DRC, BUT CAN DO SO ONLY IF IT IS CLEAR THAT UGANDA
AND RWANDA ARE ALSO WITHDRAWING. HE REPORTS THAT,
AFTER BEING APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE
HAD INITIATED CONVERSATIONS WITH THE EX-
FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT THEIR RESETTLEMENT IN THE
INTERIOR OF THE DRC. HOWEVER, THIS INITIATIVE WAS
HALTED WHEN KABILA LEARNED OF IT AND POSED STRONG
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
OBJECTIONS. ZIMBABWE FEELS IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID
A RUPTURE WITH KABILA, AND BELIEVES THAT DDRR ISSUES
WILL BE EASIER TO ADDRESS ONCE MONUC IS DEPLOYED ON
THE GROUND AND IF THERE IS BROADER INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT. HE ARGUES THAT THESE ISSUES ARE MORE
EASILY PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, AND URGES THAT THE
USG INTENSIFY ITS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, PARTICULARLY
BETWEEN KINSHASA AND HARARE. END SUMMARY.



--------------------------


BACKGROUND OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING


--------------------------





2. (C) : ON APRIL 21 S/E WOLPE, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD,
LT. COL. GADDIS AND ECONOFF NOTETAKER MET WITH
EMERSON MNANGAGWA, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF
PRESIDENT MUGABE, TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE CONGO AND THE EXECUTION OF THE LUSAKA PEACE
ACCORD. IN A NEARLY 90 MINUTE-LONG MEETING, THE
JUSTICE MINISTER COVERED CONSIDERABLE GROUND, AND
OFFERED PARTICULARLY CANDID OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE
EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE AND ZIMBABWE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
KABILA.



3. (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT ZIMBABWE HAD BECOME VERY
ANXIOUS ABOUT THE INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED ON THE
GROUND SINCE THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE/DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT. THE VARIOUS PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS AND
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS HAD RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
COMMITMENT BY THOSE INVOLVED, AND THERE WERE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
SUSPICIONS THAT SOME SIDES STILL SOUGHT MILITARY
GAINS. ZIMBABWE FEARED THAT EVENTS MIGHT BE SPINNING
OUT OF CONTROL.



4. (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT IT WAS MUSEVENI WHO HAD
SUGGESTED THE VICTORIA FALLS MEETING, AND WHO HAD
UNDERTAKEN TO DELIVER KAGAME. MUGABE AND NUJOMA HAD
PROMISED TO DELIVER DOS SANTOS, WITH KABILA ALSO
INVITED. THE IDEA WAS TO HAVE "AN INFORMAL, NON-
BINDING SETTING" IN WHICH THE LEADERS MIGHT REMOVE
ANY OBSTACLES THAT HAD EMERGED AS A RESULT OF THE
INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PAST THREE TO
FOUR WEEKS. THE ZIMBABWEANS INTENDED TO PRESS FOR A
RENEWED SENSE OF COMMITMENT TO DISENGAGEMENT AT THE
HIGHEST LEVEL; TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH THE TWO SIDES
COULD "VOLUNTARILY MOVE BACKWARD" IN THE SPIRIT OF
COMMITMENT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT; AND TO FIND A
METHOD OF INSURING THAT AGREEMENTS MADE WERE HONORED.
IF THE LEADERS "SEE LIGHT," THEY WILL THEN BRIEF
CHILUBA. MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA
WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS FOR A PULLBACK. (ANGOLA,
HE SAID, HAD VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND
WAS NO LONGER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.) HE BELIEVED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3112

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

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DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 FAAE-00
FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /010W


--------------------------

4EC11C 212008Z /38
P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5810
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LUANDA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

THAT UGANDA WOULD POSE NO FURTHER PROBLEMS IN MOVING
TO DISENGAGE THE FORCES ON THE GROUND, BUT HE WAS
LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RWANDA.



5. (C) ACCORDING TO THE JUSTICE MINISTER, MBEKI AND
CHISSANO WERE COMING TO VIC FALLS FOR A DIFFERENT
REASON: TO DISCUSS ZIMBABWE'S LAND QUESTION. MBEKI,
HE SAID, HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT HE NOT BE
INVOLVED IN THE INFORMAL CONGO DISCUSSIONS.



--------------------------


WHAT TO DO WITH NON-STATE ACTORS


--------------------------





6. (C) AFTER PRAISING ZIMBABWE'S LEADERSHIP IN
SECURING THE RECENT KAMPALA AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURING
THE JUSTICE MINISTER THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO
INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA AND THE
FULL RESTORATION OF CONGOLESE SOVEREIGNTY AND
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, S/E WOLPE BROACHED THE KNOTTY
PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE NON-
STATE ACTORS. HE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER IF IT
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
LUSAKA BY BOLD MOVES ON BOTH SIDES: A DEEPER
DISENGAGEMENT AND PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BY RWANDA AND
UGANDA, LINKED TO UNDERTAKINGS BY THE GDRC AND ITS
ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT AND
DEMOBILIZATION OF NON-SIGNATORY FORCES. WHAT DID
ZIMBABWE FEEL IT COULD DO THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE RWANDA
AND UGANDA TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING?



7. (C) MNANGAGWA RESPONDED FRANKLY THAT THE GOZ HAD
NOT YET DEVELOPED CONCRETE POSITIONS ON DDRR, BUT
ZIMBABWE DID RECOGNIZE THIS WAS THE CRUCIAL QUESTION.
HE SAID THAT TWO MONTHS AGO, AFTER BEING QUIETLY
APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE GAVE THE
GREEN LIGHT TO ZIMBABWE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO SEE
WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN WITH THE
EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE. HE DISCOVERED THAT THE LARGEST
PART OF THEM WANTED TO SETTLE IN THE DRC. THE
ZIMBABWEANS THEN ASKED THE HUTU FIGHTERS IF THEY
WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DISARMAMENT. IN THE
ZIMBABWEAN VIEW, A SOLUTION WAS IN SIGHT: IF THE EX-
FAR/INTERAHAMWE ELEMENTS WERE TO SETTLE IN THE DRC,
THEY WOULD NOT/NOT BE ON THE BORDER BUT IN THE
INTERIOR; THEREFORE, THEY WOULD NO LONGER POSE A
THREAT TO RWANDA OR BURUNDI.



8. (C) HOWEVER, THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONTINUED, THE
DRC LEARNED OF THE ZIMBABWEAN INITIATIVE AND KABILA
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
HAD REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY. THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD
THEREFORE TURNED OFF THIS ATTEMPT AT FINDING A
SOLUTION TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE PROBLEM. THE
ZIMBABWEAN IMMEDIATE GOAL, HE SAID, WAS "TO MAXIMIZE
ZIMBABWEAN INFLUENCE ON KABILA, RATHER THAN ON THESE
FORCES." "WE NEED TO PLAY A ROLE THAT IS APPRECIATED
BY KABILA," HE SAID, "SO WE CAN PUSH HIM TO TAKE
POSITIONS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY." ZIMBABWE HAD CONCLUDED
THAT, GIVEN KABILA'S OPPOSITION TO ANY SUCH
DISCUSSION, PUSHING THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ISSUE AT
THIS POINT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY IN TERMS OF THE
BIGGER PICTURE. (IN AN ASIDE, THE JUSTICE MINISTER
OBLIQUELY REFERENCED SOME DISCUSSIONS THE DRC HAD HAD
WITH THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT HOW THEIR DEMANDS
COULD BE ADDRESSED. HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THERE HAD
BEEN ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THESE ELEMENTS AND
EITHER UGANDA OR RWANDA.)



9. (C) MNANGAGWA AGREED THAT THE DISARMAMENT
RESOLUTION HAD TO BE RESOLVED IF LUSAKA WERE TO BE
FULLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT, HE SAID, ZIMBABWE COULD NOT
BE IN THE LEAD OR SEEN AS THE CHAMPION OF THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3113

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 OIGO-02
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
L-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00
PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00
/012W


--------------------------

4EC120 212008Z /38
P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5811
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LUANDA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

INITIATIVE. RATHER, ZIMBABWE WANTED TO SEE MORE
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS INVOLVED. ONCE MONUC DEPLOYED,
ZIMBABWE WOULD BE LESS SIGNIFICANT AND LESS VISIBLE,
AND IT WOULD BE EASIER TO WORK THE DDRR ISSUES. IT
WOULD ALSO BE EASIER TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULT DDRR
ISSUES IF THEY WERE PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, HE
SAID.



10. (C) WOLPE OBSERVED, WITH THE JUSTICE MINISTER'S
CONCURRENCE, THAT KABILA DID IN FACT APPEAR TO
RESPOND TO STRONG PRESSURE. WHY, THEN, WAS ZIMBABWE
RELUCTANT TO EXERT THE SAME PRESSURE ON KABILA ON THE
DISARMAMENT ISSUE THAT IT HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT?
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A CORE ISSUE FOR
KABILA, AND ZIMBABWEANS FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES IF
THEY PUSHED KABILA TOO FAR. KABILA WAS ALREADY
SHOPPING AROUND FOR OTHERS TO FILL THE ZIMBABWEAN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z
ROLE, AND THAT HAD MADE THE GOZ EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS.
WOLPE NOTED THAT ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT KABILA HAD
PURCHASED HAD DONE LITTLE TO IMPROVE KABILA'S
POSITION, AND THAT HE REMAINED DEPENDENT 0N THE
ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. MNANGAGWA SAID THAT, WHILE THIS
MIGHT BE TRUE, KABILA COULD PROVIDE MORE SIGNIFICANT
ARMS TO THE NON-SIGNATORY FORCES, AND CREATE HAVOC
FOR THE CONGO AND THE REGION. KABILA, HE SAID, HAD
EARLIER PROVIDED SOME ARMS TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE,
BUT THIS ARMS SUPPLY HAD BEEN LIMITED THANKS TO
ZIMBABWEAN INTERVENTION.



--------------------------


HOW ABOUT RESUPPLY AND TRAINING?


--------------------------





11. (C) WOLPE ASKED IF ZIMBABWE AND THE ALLIES MIGHT
BE ABLE, IN EXCHANGE FOR A DISENGAGEMENT INITIATIVE
BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, TO AT LEAST INSURE THE
CESSATION OF TRAINING AND RESUPPLY OF THE NON-
SIGNATORY FORCES. MNANGAGWA INITIALLY RESPONDED THAT
THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO MANAGE, AND
THAT ZIMBABWE HOPED THAT CHILUBA AND MASIRE COULD
ASSIST THE PARTIES "IN TALKING ACROSS THE LINES."
SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, MNANGAGWA SAID THAT HE
BELIEVED A COMMITMENT TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND
RESUPPLY COULD IN FACT BE MADE BY THE ALLIES TO
UGANDA AND RWANDA.



--------------------------


MASIRE AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z


--------------------------





12. (C) WOLPE TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF MASIRE AND
THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE, DESCRIBING THE EFFORTS
THE USG HAD BEEN MAKING TO GET KABILA TO UNDERSTAND
THAT HE COULD EMERGE IN A STRONGER POSITION BY FULLY
EMBRACING LUSAKA AND ACCEPTING MASIRE'S FACILITATION.
MNANGAGWA AGREED WITH WOLPE, AND SAID THAT ZIMBABWE
HAD MADE THE SAME POINT WITH THE CONGOLESE PRESIDENT.
HE SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT MASIRE ESTABLISH A
MORE PUBLIC PROFILE, AND THAT HE BE SEEN TO BE
ACTIVELY CONSULTING WITH ALL OF THE REGIONAL
CAPITALS.



--------------------------


WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?


--------------------------





13. (C) WHEN ASKED BY S/E WOLPE WHAT MESSAGE HE
COULD CARRY FROM HARARE TO RWANDA AND UGANDA, THE
JUSTICE MINISTER REPLIED: "THAT ZIMBABWE IS ANXIOUS
TO SEE A CONCLUSION TO THIS WAR." MNANGAGWA OBSERVED
THAT RWANDA AND UGANDA WOULD NO DOUBT SAY THE SAME
THING. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE: "BECAUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 FAAE-00
FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /010W


--------------------------

4EC124 212008Z /38
P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5812
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LUANDA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA ARE SERIOUSLY WORKING ON A WAY
TO PULL OUT." "BUT," HE CONTINUED, "ZIMBABWE CAN NOT
GIVE AWAY THEIR GAME TO RWANDA AND UGANDA. THEY HAVE
TO BE PULLING OUT AS WELL, AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE
IS NEEDED ON THE GROUND TO SHINE A BRIGHT LIGHT ON
ALL THE PLAYERS' ACTIONS AND BE AN IMPARTIAL
WITNESS." HOW THE WITHDRAWAL IS STRUCTURED CAN BE
WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIPS. IN FACT,
MNANGAGWA SAID, A ZIMBABWE MILITARY TEAM HAD BEEN
DISPATCHED TO MBUJI-MAI TO BEGIN OPERATIONAL PLANNING
FOR A PULLOUT FROM THE DRC. WHILE THIS WOULD CLEARLY
HAVE TO BE VETTED AND APPROVED BY THE TOP MILITARY
AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, THEY HAD STARTED THE BALL
ROLLING. THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONCLUDED: IF THERE
ARE PROBLEMS ONCE THE UN FORCES ARE ON THE GROUND, IT
WILL BE FROM RWANDA AND UGANDA, NOT FROM ZIMBABWE.



--------------------------


THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z


--------------------------





14. (C) AS PART OF HIS OVER-ALL PROGNOSIS, THE
JUSTICE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT SOUTH AFRICA MAY NOW
BE IN A POSITION TO PLAY "A MORE NEUTRAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVE" ROLE IN THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT.
MNANGAGWA SAID THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD BEEN PUSHING
KABILA TO DISTINGUISH SOUTH AFRICA AND MBEKI FROM
MANDELA, WHOM KABILA NEVER LIKED. "WE WANT KABILA TO
OPEN HIS HEART TO MBEKI," HE SAID. MBEKI, HE ADDED,
HAD SO FAR PLAYED IT VERY WELL WITH KABILA.



--------------------------


NO TO REGIONAL SANCTIONS


--------------------------





15. (C) WOLPE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER WHETHER THE
LUSAKA SIGNATORIES HAD CONSIDERED THE IMPOSITION OF
REGIONAL SANCTIONS ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATORS.
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL.
IT WAS FAR BETTER AT WORKING AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE
AMONG THE PARTIES.



--------------------------


IS THERE A PLAN B?


--------------------------





16. (C) WOLPE ASKED MNANGAGWA IF ZIMBABWE AND THE
ALLIES HAD ANY PLAN B IN MIND, SHOULD KABILA IN THE
END PROVE WHOLLY IMPERVIOUS TO THE PRESSURES THAT
WERE BEING APPLIED? THE JUSTICE MINISTER RESPONDED
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z
WITH A SMILE: "THIS IS A DANGEROUS QUESTION." IN ANY
EVENT, HE CONTINUED, KABILA APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD
HEALTH, AND "WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH HIM."
HOWEVER, "KABILA SEES ZIMBABWE AS AN ALLY THAT HAS
TAKEN OVER A DANGEROUS PROPORTION OF THE DRC'S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THIS MAKES HIM UNCOMFORTABLE."
MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT RECENTLY THE ALLIES HAD INSISTED
THAT KABILA AGREE THAT ALL FAC FORCES WOULD OPERATE
ONLY UNDER CENTRAL COMMAND. HOWEVER, KABILA REJECTED
THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTION TO THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHICH IS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED IN
THREE PROVINCES; KINSHASA, ORIENTALE AND KATANGA.



--------------------------


MORE USG SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY IS NEEDED


--------------------------





17. (C) WOLPE ASKED IF THE USG COULD BE HELPFUL IN
STRENGTHENING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ZIMBABWE, ON THE
ONE HAND, AND RWANDA AND UGANDA, ON THE OTHER.
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT ZIMBABWE HAD GOOD LINES OF
COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOTH RWANDA AND UGANDA, BUT THEY
WERE INTENTIONALLY BEING KEPT TO A LOW LEVEL FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3116

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 OIGO-02
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
L-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00
PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00
/012W


--------------------------

4EC127 212008Z /38
P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5813
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LUANDA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

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PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

MOMENT. HOWEVER, ONCE THE DECISION WAS TAKEN, THERE
COULD BE AN EXPLOSION OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT AND
COMMUNICATION. THIS WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM.
HOWEVER, WHAT WOULD HELP NOW IS IF THE USG WOULD
ENGAGE IN MUCH MORE FREQUENT SHUTTLING BETWEEN THE
CAPITALS OF KINSHASA AND HARARE, BETWEEN KABILA AND
MUGABE..



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COMMENT


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18. (C) THE REMARKABLE CANDOR OF THE JUSTICE
MINISTER -- NOTING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO LUSAKA
IMPLEMENTATION OF DDRR; ACKNOWLEDGING HIS OWN
DISCUSSIONS WITH, AND REFLECTIONS ABOUT, THE EX-
FAR/INTERHAMWE; AND DESCRIBING ZIMBABWE'S DIFFICULT
RELATIONSHIP WITH KABILA -- IS TESTIMONY TO
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ZIMBABWE'S URGENT NEED TO FIND A QUICK WAY OUT OF THE
DROC. KABILA'S REJECTION OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION ON DDRR REMAINS A MAJOR HURDLE TO LUSAKA
IMPLEMENTATION. IN THE VIEW OF MNANGAGWA, THIS COULD
BEST BE ADDRESSED THROUGH BROADER INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. THE ELEMENTS OF AN INITIAL
DEAL COULD BE IN THE MAKING, THOUGH, IF THE
ZIMBABWEANS WOULD BE WILLING AT SOME POINT TO COMMIT
JOINTLY WITH THEIR ALLIES TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND
RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE.



19. (C) PARTICULARLY STRIKING WAS MNANGAGWA'S
REQUEST THAT THE USG ENGAGE IN MORE ACTIVE AND
CONTINUOUS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, SPECIFICALLY BETWEEN
KABILA AND HIS OWN BOSS, MUGABE. IT WOULD APPEAR
ALSO THAT ZIMBABWE'S COMFORT LEVEL WITH SOUTH AFRICA
HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH MBEKI'S ASSUMPTION
OF THE PRESIDENCY. ZIMBABWE'S LEANING ON KABILA TO
ACCEPT A SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE MAY ULTIMATELY MAKE IT
POSSIBLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO PLAY A MORE SUBSTANTIVE
ROLE IN DROC PEACEKEEPING. END COMMENT.

MCDONALD

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