Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
00HANOI1160
2000-05-26 08:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

A VIETNAMESE JANUS: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES OF THE POLITBURO

Tags:  PGOV PINR ECON PHUM VM DPOL 
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260846Z May 00

 2000HANOI01160 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0852

PAGE 01 HANOI 01160 01 OF 10 261123Z 
ACTION EAP-00 

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CTME-00 
 DINT-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 ANHR-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 
 EXIM-01 OIGO-02 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 
 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-00 VCE-00 
 MOFM-04 MOF-03 AC-01 DCP-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 
 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 
 SSO-00 STR-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 
 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /022W
 ------------------5BDCE2 261123Z /22 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9948
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA//
DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 HANOI 001160 

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HANOI 01160 01 OF 10 261123Z
STATE ALSO FOR EAP A/S ROTH AND DAS BOYCE AND EAP/BCLTV
STATE ALSO FOR DRL, EB, INR/EAP/SEA, INR/EAP/CM, INR/B
STATE PASS USTR AMB FISHER/DAUSTR DAMOND
NSC FOR KEN LIEBERTHAL AND RAVIC HUSO
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP TED OSIUS
WHITE HOUSE FOR DEP/ASST TO POTUS LBRAINARD
OSD FOR ISA/EAP/LSTERN
USDOC FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OKSA/HPPHO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/2010
TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON PHUM VM DPOL
SUBJECT: A VIETNAMESE JANUS: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES OF THE POLITBURO

REF: A) HANOI 839 B) HANOI 232

(U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM JAMES BRUNO,
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 HANOI 001160

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HANOI 01160 01 OF 10 261123Z
STATE ALSO FOR EAP A/S ROTH AND DAS BOYCE AND EAP/BCLTV
STATE ALSO FOR DRL, EB, INR/EAP/SEA, INR/EAP/CM, INR/B
STATE PASS USTR AMB FISHER/DAUSTR DAMOND
NSC FOR KEN LIEBERTHAL AND RAVIC HUSO
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP TED OSIUS
WHITE HOUSE FOR DEP/ASST TO POTUS LBRAINARD
OSD FOR ISA/EAP/LSTERN
USDOC FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OKSA/HPPHO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/2010
TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON PHUM VM DPOL
SUBJECT: A VIETNAMESE JANUS: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES OF THE POLITBURO

REF: A) HANOI 839 B) HANOI 232

(U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM JAMES BRUNO,
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: VIETNAM'S KEY LEADERSHIP BODY -- THE
CURRENTLY 18-MEMBER POLITBURO -- IS A LARGELY SHADOWY GROUP
WHOSE MEETINGS, AND MANY OF ITS MEMBERS' ACTIVITIES, ARE
HIDDEN FROM PUBLIC VIEW. THE FIVE SEXAGENARIAN MEN IN THE
STANDING COMMITTEE, THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY'S POLITICAL BUREAU, HAVE HIGHLY VISIBLE PUBLIC
PERSONAS. BUT HALF OF THE POLITBURO MEMBERS VIRTUALLY NEVER
APPEAR IN THE VIETNAMESE PRESS, ACCORDING TO A TWO-MONTH
ANALYSIS BY THE EMBASSY. LIKEWISE, THE PARTY'S THREE SENIOR
ADVISORS, INCLUDING POWERFUL FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH,
ARE FEATURED ONLY IRREGULARLY IN OFFICIAL MEDIA, AND USUALLY
ONLY FOR CEREMONIAL OCCASIONS.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 01 OF 10 261123Z


2. (C) WITH SO LITTLE PUBLIC INTERACTION AND VISIBILITY --
MUCH LESS DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS -- THERE IS LITTLE PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. THIS IS A GROUP
THAT EXERCISES ITS SUPREME POLITICAL POWER IN A CLOISTERED
AND OPAQUE ENVIRONMENT, IN A HIGHLY PATERNALISTIC FASHION.
AMONG THIS CONSENSUS-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP, SOME RISING STARS
ARE APPARENT: ON THE MORE IDEOLOGICAL WING ARE HANOI PARTY
CHIEF TRONG AND ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSAR NGAN, WHILE AMONG
THE MORE TECHNOCRATIC REFORMERS ARE DEPUTY PM DUNG, PARTY
ECONOMIC COMMISSION CHIEF SANG, AND HCMC PARTY LEADER TRIET.
THE POLITBURO'S RELIANCE ON CONSENSUS IN ITS DECISION-MAKING
CONTRIBUTES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT,
BUT IT ALSO MEANS THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON DRAMATIC
REFORMS IS VERY DIFFICULT. THIS IS THE QUANDARY OF THE

MOMENT, WHEN THE MOST IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS ARE PREVENTING
MOVEMENT FORWARD ON THE ECONOMIC REFORMS VIETNAM SO BADLY
NEEDS. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
HOW THE POLITBURO IS PORTRAYED IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) THIS IS THE FIRST OF AN ONGOING SERIES OF CABLES
ANALYZING THE PUBLIC PROFILE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
POLITBURO, AS WELL AS THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV). IN LATE FEBRUARY THE
EMBASSY BEGAN A TRACKING PROJECT TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES,
MEETINGS, AND SPEECHES OF THESE KEY OFFICIALS IN LEADING
OFFICIAL MEDIA -- PRINCIPALLY THE CPV MOUTHPIECE "NHAN DAN"
(THE PEOPLE) AND VIETNAMESE NEWS SERVICE (VNS),BUT ALSO
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 01 OF 10 261123Z
"HANOI MOI" (NEW HANOI),"TUOI TRE" (YOUTH),AND "SAIGON
GIAI PHONG" (SAIGON LIBERATION). BY FOCUSING ON THESE
LEADING PAPERS, POST IS TRACKING HOW VIETNAM'S CPV LEADERS
ARE PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC BY THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
PRESS. SINCE THE POLITBURO IS SUCH A SECRETIVE, RECLUSIVE
BODY, THIS ONGOING RESEARCH WILL HELP US TO ANALYZE BETTER
ITS ACTIVITIES AND PROFILE. OVER THE NEXT YEAR, IN THE RUN-
UP TO THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS IN EARLY 2001, ROUGHLY EVERY
TWO MONTHS WE PLAN TO ANALYZE THE TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES OF
POLITBURO MEMBERS, AS A SUPPLEMENTAL TO OUR ONGOING SPOT
REPORTS, ANALYSES, AND "PULSE OF THE PARTY" SERIES.

-------------- --------------
GROUP LEADERSHIP BY "THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR"
-------------- --------------


4. (C) WHEN ANALYZING THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE
VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, ONE FIRST NEEDS TO RECOGNIZE THIS IS
A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP THAT RULES BY BROAD CONSENSUS. FOR
EXAMPLE, IN THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU
AND FORMER PRESIDENT ANH HAVE BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING
THE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION-MAKING IN A MORE IDEOLOGICAL
MANNER. BUT THEY HAVE ONLY BEEN ABLE TO DO THIS BY SHAPING
CONSENSUS AMONG THEIR COLLEAGUES. IN A SENSE, THE
INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS AND FUNDAMENTAL CAUTION OF THE
POLITBURO ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE SUM OF ITS CONSTITUENT
PARTS.


5. (C) AS IN ANY POLITICAL SYSTEM, INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP
PERSONALITIES AND ABILITIES ARE IMPORTANT, BUT OVER THE PAST
FOUR DECADES, THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN STRIKINGLY
UNIFIED IN ITS FUNDAMENTAL GOALS AND COLLECTIVE INTERESTS.
IN YEARS PAST, THERE HAVE BEEN A HANDFUL OF INTERNECINE
BATTLES WHOSE RESULTS HAVE BEEN FLASHED BRIEFLY TO THE
PUBLIC, AND OCCASIONALLY POLITBURO MEMBERS HAVE BEEN RETIRED
IN DISGRACE OR PUT UNDER RESTRICTIONS AFTER BEING SACKED.
BUT VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST HISTORY IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT
OF CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HAS LURCHED FROM THE VIOLENT
EXCESSES OF THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD TO THE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION TO THE TRIAL OF MAOISTS AND THE DRAMATIC
BEGINNING OF MARKET REFORMS UNDER DENG XIAOPING. BY
CONTRAST, VIETNAM'S PERIOD OF COMMUNIST RULE IS STRIKING FOR
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 02 OF 10 261122Z
THE GRADUALISM -- ONE COULD ARGUE STAGNATION -- OF ITS
CONSENSUS-BASED LEADERSHIP. SEVERAL CPV GENERAL
SECRETARIES, SUCH AS LE DUAN AND NGUYEN VAN LINH, HAVE BEEN

SIPDIS
VERY POWERFUL, BUT THEIRS HAS NOT BEEN A PERSONAL MANDATE SO
MUCH AS A COLLECTIVE ONE, AND NONE OF THEM ATTEMPTED TO MOVE
TO ESTABLISH A PERSONALISTIC DICTATORSHIP. BY SELF-
DEFINITION, VIETNAM CLAIMS TO BE A DICTATORSHIP OF THE
PROLETARIAT. MORE ACCURATELY, IT IS A COLLECTIVE OLIGARCHIC
DICTATORSHIP OF ONE PARTY.


6. (C) THIS LEADERSHIP STYLE OF THE CPV -- EMPHASIZING
CONSENSUS AND GRADUALISM IN DECISION-MAKING -- HAS A
POWERFUL IMPACT ON POLICY. VIETNAM'S MODERN HISTORY HAS
SHOWN THAT ONLY WHEN THE CPV IS FACED WITH A PROFOUND
DOMESTIC CRISIS WILL THE PARTY LEADERSHIP DECIDE FOR
DRAMATIC CHANGE. THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS THE
ADVENT OF "DOI MOI" (RENOVATION) ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 1985-86
THAT FREED UP THE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL SECTORS FROM THE
DISASTER OF COLLECTIVIST FARMING THAT HAD PUSHED THE COUNTRY
TO THE BRINK OF STARVATION. IN THE MID-1980'S, A BROAD
CONSENSUS FORMED AMONG CPV LEADERS, WHO CLEARLY RECOGNIZED
THAT DRAMATIC CHANGES WERE NECESSARY TO PREVENT MASSIVE
SOCIAL UNREST. THE RESULTANT DECADE OF HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC
GROWTH OWES IN LARGE PART TO THIS PERIOD OF REFORMS IN
RESPONSE TO CRISIS. THE PROBLEM TODAY, HOWEVER, IS THAT, IN
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH DIRE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CONSENSUS-BASED
POLITBURO SEEMS TO BE INCAPABLE OF AGREEING ON DIFFICULT
REFORM CHOICES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLITBURO HAS BEEN UNABLE
TO AGREE ON A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR THE PRIVATIZATION OF STATE
ENTERPRISES, SINCE THOUSANDS OF POLITICALLY WELL-CONNECTED
WORKERS (READ CPV MEMBERS) WOULD LOSE THEIR JOBS IN ORDER TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 02 OF 10 261122Z
CREATE FAR MORE JOBS THROUGH INCREASED FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND BETTER USE OF STATE MONIES. THE PAROCHIAL INTERESTS OF
A FEW -- WHO ARE POLITICALLY WELL REPRESENTED IN THE
LEADERSHIP -- TRUMP THE PLANS OF MORE REFORM-MINDED LEADERS.


7. (C) THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUTION AND GRADUALISM OF THE
VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION-MAKING STYLE CAN BE TRACED
IN PART TO THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE AGAINST FRENCH COLONIAL
RULE AND AGAINST THE U.S.-BACKED SOUTHERN GOVERNMENT IN
VIETNAM'S CIVIL WAR. THE INSURGENT MILITARY STRATEGIES
ADOPTED BY HO CHI MINH AND HIS KEY MILITARY ADVISORS SUCH AS
GEN. GIAP WERE FORGED BY A COLLEGIAL, COLLECTIVIST
LEADERSHIP AND CARRIED OUT BY THE PATIENT, LONG-TERM PURSUIT
OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES. MANY SENIOR CPV LEADERS, WHOSE
FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES WERE IN THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION
STRUGGLE," BELIEVE THAT STAYING THE COURSE IN A MEASURED,
"STEP BY STEP" MANNER IS AN IMPORTANT VIRTUE BORNE OUT BY
THE SUCCESSES OF THOSE VIETNAMESE MILITARY VICTORIES.


8. (C) THUS, IT IS VIRTUAL HOLY WRIT FOR MOST PARTY LEADERS
THAT STABILITY, PATIENCE AND GRADUALISM WILL ULTIMATELY WIN
THE DAY. THE LEADERSHIP'S EXCESSIVE CAUTION, AS WELL AS
CONTINUING SUSPICION ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE "NEW FACE
OF IMPERIALISM," CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PARALYSIS IS
THE ORDER OF THE DAY. THE LEADERSHIP MAKE DECISIONS BY
LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR: CONSENSUS CAN BE BLOCKED BY THE
OPPOSITION OF A HANDFUL OF MEMBERS, SOMETIMES EVEN ONE.
WITHIN THE PARTY, THERE IS NO INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO
FORCE THE LEADERSHIP TO MAKE TOUGH CHOICES, SUCH AS ON
DIFFICULT BUDGET QUESTIONS. IN PART THIS IS BECAUSE THERE
IS NO MEANS FOR DIRECT PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, SINCE THE
PARTY AND ITS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT ORGANS ARE NOT
ULTIMATELY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PUBLIC. (COMMENT: WHILE
ELECTIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE
HELD, THE COMPLETE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE PROCESS GIVES
LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE RESULTS PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC.)
IN THIS CLIMATE, VIETNAM'S COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP EXERCISES
ITS SUPREME POLITICAL POWER.

-------------- --------------
PUBLIC ACTIVITIES OF THE POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE
-------------- --------------
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 03 OF 10 260849Z


9. (C) DURING THE TEN-WEEK PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 25 TO APRIL
30, EIGHT OF THE 15 POLITBURO MEMBERS WERE FEATURED IN THE
PRESS ON AT LEAST 10 DIFFERENT DATES. INCLUDED AMONG THESE
EIGHT ARE THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO STANDING
COMMITTEE, WHO ARE AMONG THOSE WHO MOST FREQUENTLY PRESENT
THE "PUBLIC FACE" OF THE LEADERSHIP. THE FIVE -- CPV
GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU, PRESIDENT TRAN DUC LUONG,
PRIME MINISTER PHAN VAN KHAI, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER NONG
DUC MANH, AND FATHERLAND FRONT LEADER PHAM THE DUYET -- WERE
EACH FEATURED IN PROMINENT, SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE AT LEAST 10
DAYS OUT OF THE EIGHT-WEEK PERIOD. (BY CONTRAST, ONLY THREE
OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS WERE FEATURED THIS OFTEN -- DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN MANH CAM,
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG, AND HO CHI MINH CITY
PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MINH TRIET.) THE FIVE SENIOR LEADERS
WERE FEATURED RECEIVING GUESTS, ATTENDING MEETINGS AND
SEMINARS, AND GIVING SPEECHES. SUCH PROMINENT COVERAGE IN
THE OFFICIAL PRESS IS NOT SURPRISING, GIVEN THAT THESE FIVE
FIGURES OCCUPY POSITIONS THAT HAVE MAJOR PROTOCOL FUNCTIONS
AS THE RESPECTIVE HEADS OF THE FIVE MAIN LEADERSHIP POWER
CENTERS ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL: PARTY, STATE, GOVERNMENT,
ASSEMBLY, AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS.


10. (C) GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU, RANKED FIRST IN THE CPV,
WAS FEATURED IN THE CPV MOUTHPIECE "NHAN DAN" ON 13
DIFFERENT DATES. HE RECEIVED OFFICIAL VISITORS EIGHT TIMES,
INCLUDING WORLD BANK PRESIDENT WOLFENSOHN; MADE VISITS
AROUND VIETNAM FOUR TIMES, INCLUDING IN LATE FEBRUARY TO
THAI BINH PROVINCE, SITE OF PROVINCIAL UNREST TWO YEARS AGO;
ATTENDED COMMEMORATIONS OF THE "LIBERATION" OF HO CHI MINH
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 03 OF 10 260849Z
CITY; AND GAVE TWO PROMINENT SPEECHES, INCLUDING ONE OPENING
THE CPV CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM APRIL 10. (TWO OF THESE
EVENTS TOOK PLACE THE SAME DAY.) PHIEU'S APPEARANCES IN THE
PRESS, LIKE THOSE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, TEND TO BE MORE
"SUBSTANTIVE" THAN THOSE OF MOST POLITBURO MEMBERS. (MANY
OF THE MEDIA APPEARANCES OF LESS PROMINENT POLITBURO MEMBERS
LIST THEM MERELY AS ATTENDING CONFERENCES OR CEREMONIAL
EVENTS, WITHOUT FURTHER DETAIL.) PHIEU'S HIGHLY VISIBLE
TREATMENT HIGHLIGHTS HIS PROMINENCE IN THE POWER STRUCTURE.
THE IMAGE PROJECTED BY THE OFFICIAL MEDIA IS OF A GENERAL
SECRETARY WHO IS ACTIVE AND ENGAGED. IN THE PAST EIGHT

SIPDIS
MONTHS, PHIEU APPEARS TO HAVE CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION WITH
THE SUPPORT OF HIS MENTOR, FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH.
PHIEU AND ANH HAVE WORKED CLOSELY SINCE SERVING TOGETHER AS
DEPUTY COMMANDER AND COMMANDER OF VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION
FORCES IN CAMBODIA IN THE LATE 1980'S.


11. (C) PRESIDENT LUONG, RANKED SECOND IN THE CPV, HAS A
LARGELY CEREMONIAL POSITION HIGH ON PROTOCOL AND OFFICIAL
VISITS. HE WAS FEATURED ON 21 DIFFERENT DAYS DURING THE TWO
MONTHS. MOST OF HIS APPEARANCES WERE MAKING OFFICIAL VISITS
ABROAD OR RECEIVING FOREIGN VISITORS IN HANOI. FOR EXAMPLE,
HE VISITED UKRAINE, MONGOLIA, AND CUBA, ATTENDING THE G-77
SUMMIT IN HAVANA. HE MET VISITING LEADERS FROM BELARUS,
NORTH KOREA, LAOS, INDIA, CONGO, SINGAPORE, AND THE U.S.,
INCLUDING SECDEF COHEN. HE ALSO ADDRESSED DOMESTIC
CONFERENCES ON MILITARY MASS MOBILIZATION AND JOURNALISM.
AN ANALYSIS OF LUONG'S ACTIVITIES REVEALS THAT WHILE HE HAS
A HIGHLY VISIBLE POSITION, HIS ROLE IS LESS SUBSTANTIVE THAN
THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S OR PRIME MINISTER'S. (COMMENT: AS
REPORTED REF A, GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU REPORTEDLY IS
INTERESTED IN COMBINING THE ROLES OF GENERAL SECRETARY AND
STATE PRESIDENT; IN SUCH A CASE, LUONG LIKELY WOULD ASSUME A
POSITION OF EVEN LESS INFLUENCE AND BE DROPPED FROM THE
STANDING COMMITTEE. END COMMENT.)


12. (C) PRIME MINISTER KHAI, HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
THIRD-RANKING IN THE CPV, HAD THE HIGHEST VISIBILITY OF ANY
POLITBURO MEMBER IN THE PRESS DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD;
HE APPEARED IN THE PRESS ON 30 DIFFERENT DATES. NINE TIMES
HE RECEIVED OFFICIAL VISITORS, INCLUDING MANY OF THOSE SEEN
BY LUONG; 13 TIMES HE LED GOVERNMENT MEETINGS OR SEMINARS,
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 04 OF 10 261123Z
INCLUDING MEETINGS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DRUG CONTROL,
TRADE UNIONS, BUSINESS PROMOTION, AND A MEETING OF THE
GOVERNMENT CABINET MINISTERS. ON APRIL 29 HE GAVE THE
KEYNOTE ADDRESS IN HANOI CELEBRATING THE "LIBERATION" OF
SAIGON. ON 11 DAYS HE WAS FEATURED TRAVELING AROUND THE
COUNTRY, PRIMARILY TO SOUTHERN DELTA AND NORTHERN PROVINCES.
AS PRIME MINISTER, KHAI OCCUPIES A POSITION OF BOTH HIGH
VISIBILITY AND CLOUT WITHIN THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP, THOUGH IN RECENT MONTHS HIS MORE TECHNOCRATIC
AND REFORMIST VIEWS HAVE LOST FAVOR TO THE MORE IDEOLOGICAL
DIRECTION PUSHED BY PHIEU. KHAI, WHO SEEMS DISCOURAGED BY
THE RISE OF MORE IDEOLOGICAL THINKING, REPORTEDLY HAS
OFFERED TO RESIGN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND MANY IN HANOI
SPECULATE HE MAY BE REPLACED AS PRIME MINISTER, PERHAPS BY
ANOTHER SOUTHERN REFORMER, BEFORE OR AT THE COMMUNIST PARTY
CONGRESS IN MARCH 2001.


13. (C) NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH, FOURTH-RANKING IN
THE PARTY, WAS FEATURED ON 22 DAYS. ON SEVEN OCCASIONS HE
RECEIVED FOREIGN LEGISLATORS, INCLUDING SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-
AZ),REP. BILL ARCHER (R-TX),AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKERS
FROM BELARUS AND NEW ZEALAND. ON SEVEN DAYS HE WAS PICTURED
ON INTERNATIONAL TRAVELS, INCLUDING AN APRIL 4-10 VISIT TO
CHINA, WHERE HE MET JIANG ZEMIN AND LI PENG. ON EIGHT DAYS
HE TRAVELED INSIDE VIETNAM OR ATTENDED EVENTS IN HANOI. AS
THE ONLY ETHNIC MINORITY IN THE LEADERSHIP, MANH HAS A
RELATIVELY HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE, THOUGH WE DO NOT PERCEIVE HE
HAS MUCH CLOUT WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
STAFF HAVE INFORMED US MANH SEEMS INTENT ON "NOT ROCKING THE
BOAT." (COMMENT: THIS TRAIT HELPS ACCOUNT FOR THE POLITICAL
SURVIVAL OF MANY OF THE LOW-PROFILE MEMBERS OF THE
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 04 OF 10 261123Z
POLITBURO. IN VIETNAM'S CONSENSUS-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP,
STANDING OUT USUALLY IS NOT GOOD FOR HANGING ON. END
COMMENT.)


14. (C) FIFTH-RANKING MEMBER DUYET, WHO HEADS UP THE VIETNAM
FATHERLAND FRONT (VFF),WAS FEATURED 15 TIMES IN THE
OFFICIAL PRESS. ON NINE DAYS HE ATTENDED MEETINGS OR
CEREMONIAL EVENTS IN HANOI, INCLUDING WOMEN'S DAY
CELEBRATIONS, ARTISTIC EXHIBITIONS, MEETINGS WITH MINORITIES
AND COMMUNIST YOUTH, AND THE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION. TWICE HE
RECEIVED FOREIGN VISITORS FROM LAOS AND BURMA, AND FOUR
TIMES HE WAS DEPICTED TRAVELING IN-COUNTRY TO CENTRAL AND
NORTHERN PROVINCES. DUYET'S PUBLIC PROFILE HAS BECOME
HIGHER SINCE HE TOOK OVER THE VFF LAST YEAR. THOUGH IT WILL
NOT BECOME CLEAR UNTIL THE PARTY CONGRESS, IT APPEARS
DUYET'S CLOUT AMONG THE LEADERSHIP HAS DROPPED DURING THE
PAST YEAR. REPORTEDLY HE IS NOT IN FAVOR WITH FORMER
PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH, WHO HAS HELPED GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU
CONSOLIDATE CONTROL WITHIN THE PARTY DURING THE PAST SIX
MONTHS.

-------------- --------------
A HANDFUL OF OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS FEATURED PROMINENTLY
-------------- --------------



15. (C) FOUR OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS ALSO HAVE RELATIVELY
HIGH PROFILES, APPEARING IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS AT LEAST A
DOZEN TIMES -- DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FORMER FOREIGN
MINISTER NGUYEN MANH CAM, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN
DUNG, HO CHI MINH CITY PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MINH TRIET, AND
HANOI PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN PHU TRONG. CAM AND DUNG HAVE HIGH-
PROFILE POSITIONS AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS OVERSEEING
FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC POLICY, RESPECTIVELY. TRIET AND
TRONG WERE RECENTLY NAMED TO HEAD THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE NATION'S TWO LARGEST CITIES AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE
FEATURED FREQUENTLY IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA. THEY ARE BOTH
RISING STARS IN THE PARTY: TRIET AS A CHAMPION OF MORE
TECHNOCRATIC/REFORMIST VIEWS, AND TRONG AS ONE OF THE MORE
IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP. IN ADDITION,
MINISTER OF DEFENSE PHAM VAN TRA AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC
SECURITY LE MINH HUONG WERE FEATURED SIX AND FIVE TIMES,
RESPECTIVELY, IN THE NATIONAL PRESS IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 05 OF 10 260900Z
MINISTERS. (TRA AND HUONG APPEAR MORE FREQUENTLY IN OTHER
MEDIA, SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS CONTROLLED BY THEIR MINISTRIES.)


16. (C) DEPUTY PM CAM, WHO MOVED UP TO SIXTH IN THE
POLITBURO FOLLOWING THE DEATH LAST YEAR OF FORMER DEFENSE
MINISTER DOAN KHUE, APPEARED 19 TIMES IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS
DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD, DESPITE LOSING HIS TITLE AS
FOREIGN MINISTER IN FEBRUARY. CAM CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN A
BUSY SCHEDULE OF HOSTING FOREIGN VISITORS, INCLUDING THOSE
FROM THE U.S., JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, RUSSIA, THAILAND, CHINA,
HUNGARY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. HOWEVER, MOST OF THESE
SESSIONS WERE IN THE FOUR WEEKS FOLLOWING HIS RETIREMENT AS
FOREIGN MINISTER, WHICH SUGGESTS THESE PROTOCOL MEETINGS MAY
BECOME LESS FREQUENT IN THE FUTURE. (NOTE: FROM A PROTOCOL
POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, CAM MAY CONTINUE TO HAVE A
RELATIVELY HIGH PROFILE, SINCE HE WILL BE A USEFUL
INTERLOCUTOR FOR FOREIGN VISITORS WHO REQUIRE A MEETING OF
DEPUTY PM RANK, BUT WHO DO NOT WARRANT TAKING THE TIME OF
OTHER, BUSIER OFFICIALS.) WE BELIEVE CAM MAY BE RETIRED AT
THE PARTY CONGRESS.


17. (C) FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DUNG, WHO PLAYS A KEY
ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES,
APPEARED IN THE PRESS ON 14 DIFFERENT DATES. DUNG MET WORLD
BANK PRESIDENT WOLFENSOHN AND ECONOMIC AND BANKING
DELEGATIONS FROM CUBA, LAOS, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA. HE
ALSO WAS FEATURED EIGHT TIMES ATTENDING DOMESTIC MEETINGS OR
SEMINARS, INCLUDING MEETINGS WITH BUSINESS GROUPS, THE
VIETNAMESE INSURANCE COMPANY, ENGINEERING ASSOCIATIONS, AND
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC MEETINGS. IN ADDITION, HE JOINED
GENERAL SECRETARY PHIEU ON A TRIP TO HAIPHONG MARCH 13.
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 05 OF 10 260900Z
CURRENTLY RANKED 14TH IN THE POLITBURO, DUNG PREVIOUSLY WAS
RANKED FIFTH UNTIL A SHAKE-UP IN 1997 LED TO HIS SLIPPING IN
RANK. ONE OF THE YOUNGEST POLITBURO MEMBERS AT 51, DUNG IS
ONE OF THE SOUTHERNERS WHO IS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE TO
REPLACE KHAI, THOUGH FORMER PRESIDENT ANH REPORTEDLY OPPOSES
HIS ELEVATION. (COMMENT: ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT MAY BE AT
WORK IN THE JOCKEYING TO REPLACE PM KHAI IS THAT
CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGUES, SUCH AS PHIEU AND ANH, MAY NOT WANT
A YOUNGER, MORE CAPABLE AND EFFECTIVE PRIME MINISTER, SUCH
AS DUNG OR OTHER REFORMERS SANG OR TRIET. THEY MAY PREFER
TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND KEEP A RELATIVELY
WEAKENED PRIME MINISTER AS NOMINAL HEAD OF THE "REFORM
FACTION" OF THE CPV. END COMMENT.)


18. (C) NGUYEN MINH TRIET, RANKED 16TH, BECAME HEAD OF THE
HO CHI MINH PARTY IN FEBRUARY, REPLACING TRUONG TAN SANG.
TRIET PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN THE SHADOWS AS THE HEAD OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY'S COMMISSION ON MASS MOBILIZATION. IN A
DRAMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIVERGENT "JANUS FACES" OF THE
PARTY, THE PUBLIC PROFILES OF THE TWO HAVE REVERSED
THEMSELVES DRAMATICALLY. DURING THESE TWO MONTHS, TRIET WAS
FEATURED ON 15 DATES -- EIGHT TIMES HOSTING VISITORS, MANY
OF THEM CONSUL GENERALS IN HCMC PAYING COURTESY CALLS, AND
TEN TIMES ATTENDING MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES. (ON THREE
DATES TRIET WAS FEATURED TWICE IN THE PRESS FOR DIFFERENT
EVENTS. BY CONTRAST, SANG HAS VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED FROM
PUBLIC VIEW; HE DID NOT FEATURE IN ANY MAJOR PRESS STORIES
IN "NHAN DAN" DURING THE TWO MONTHS DOCUMENTED.) AS HCMC
PARTY LEADER, TRIET HAS PRESENTED THE IMAGE OF AN ENGAGED
LOCAL LEADER. HE HAS MET WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS FIGHTING DRUG
ABUSE IN THE CITY, ENCOURAGED YOUTH VOLUNTEERS, ADDRESSED A
CONFERENCE ON POVERTY REDUCTION, AND ATTENDED TRADE FAIRS
PROMOTING LOCALLY MADE GOODS. TRIET, WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED
AS DEPUTY HEAD OF THE HCMC PARTY ORGANIZATION, IS POPULAR IN
THE SOUTH AND SEEN BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AS ONE WHO IS
SUPPORTIVE OF PRO-BUSINESS REFORMS. LIKE DEPUTY PM DUNG AND
FORMER SAIGON CHIEF SANG, TRIET IS ONE OF THE YOUNG "UP-AND-
COMERS" AMONG SOUTHERN REFORMERS IN THE CPV. (SINCE BOTH
DUNG AND SANG APPEAR TO HAVE SOME OPPONENTS AMONG THE SENIOR
LEADERSHIP, TRIET IS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY FOR PROMOTION TO
MORE SENIOR POSITIONS, POSSIBLY INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER.)

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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 06 OF 10 260851Z

19. (C) NGUYEN PHU TRONG, CHAIR OF THE HANOI CPV COMMITTEE,
EMERGED FROM THE SHADOWS WHEN HE ASSUMED HIS CURRENT
POSITION BY SWAPPING JOBS WITH CURRENT IDEOLOGY CHIEF LE
XUAN TUNG. TRONG RANKS LAST IN THE POLITBURO BY RANK,
THOUGH THIS BELIES HIS GROWING INFLUENCE AND RISING
PROMINENCE. ONE OF THE MORE STRONGLY DOCTRINAIRE MEMBERS OF
THE POLITBURO, TRONG PREVIOUSLY APPEARED IN PUBLIC VIEW
PRIMARILY AS THE AUTHOR OF STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSES IN
THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIST PARTY THEORETICAL REVIEW, SUCH AS HIS
ESSAY ON THE CPV'S RELIANCE ON "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM" IN
LATE 1999. AFTER BECOMING HANOI CHIEF, TRONG APPEARED IN
THE PRESS 12 TIMES -- NINE TIMES CHAIRING AND ATTENDING
MEETINGS AND THREE TIMES VISITING DISTRICTS OF HANOI. FOR
EXAMPLE, TRONG CHAIRED A PLANNING MEETING FOR THE 990TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE CITY, OPENED AND CHAIRED A CONFERENCE OF
THE HANOI CPV COMMITTEE, AND OUTLINED THE CPV'S ROLE IN
TEACHING MARXIST-LENINIST VALUES IN HANOI'S UNIVERSITIES.
RECENT PRESS ARTICLES HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT TRONG HAS BEEN
ASSISTING PHAM THE DUYET IN ORGANIZING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
FIVE-MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE. BOTH A SENIOR COLONEL AT
THE LEADING MILITARY NEWSPAPER AND THE CHINESE EMBASSY
PREDICT TRONG WILL REPLACE DUYET ON THE STANDING COMMITTEE
AT THE PARTY CONGRESS. IN ANY EVENT, TRONG'S STAR IS
RISING, AND HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY MOVE UP IN RANK. TRONG'S
TRENCHANT IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS ARE THE FLAVOR IN FAVOR AT THIS
TIME, AND HE APPEARS TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF PHIEU.


20. (C) MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PHAM VAN TRA (RANKED
9TH) AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY LE MINH HUONG (13TH)
BOTH COMMAND CLOUT IN THE POLITBURO BY VIRTUE OF THEIR
IMPORTANT MINISTRIES. (BOTH MINISTRIES, GIVEN THEIR
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 06 OF 10 260851Z
NATIONAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY MANDATES, ARE AMONG THE
INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM THAT ARE MOST SUSPICIOUS OF THE U.S.
AND ITS INTENTIONS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE AMONG THOSE
LEADERS, SUCH AS TRA AND HUONG, WHO FOUGHT AGAINST THE U.S.
DURING THE WAR, BUT THIS CONCERN IS MORE BROADLY REFLECTED
IN THE MINISTRIES INSTITUTIONALLY AS WELL.) THE PUBLIC
PROFILES OF TRA AND HUONG ARE LOWER THAN CITY PARTY LEADERS
AND STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS, THOUGH THEY APPEAR IN THE
PRESS ON AVERAGE ABOUT EVERY TEN DAYS. TRA APPEARED IN
ARTICLES ON 10 DIFFERENT DATES. IN FIVE STORIES HE RECEIVED
FOREIGN VISITORS, INCLUDING SECDEF COHEN AND THE INDIAN
DEFENSE MINISTER. HE ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF GENERAL NGUYEN
BINH, AND HE CHAIRED MEETINGS REVIEWING THE TRAINING AND
MASS MOBILIZATION TASKS OF THE ARMY. MINISTER OF PUBLIC
SECURITY HUONG, NOT SURPRISINGLY AS THE HEAD OF POLICE AND
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES, APPEARED LESS FREQUENTLY. HIS SEVEN
APPEARANCES IN THE PRESS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
VISITORS (THE UKRAINIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY AND LAO INTERIOR
MINISTER),ATTENDING THE CPV PLENUM, VISITING A TEMPLE OF
THE HUNG KINGS, AND CHAIRING A MEETING OF POLICE ON THE
RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. BOTH TRA AND HUONG
ARE AMONG THE OLDER POLITBURO MEMBERS, AND ACCORDING TO SOME
REPORTS, HUONG IS NOT IN GOOD HEALTH. RUMORS CIRCULATE THAT
ONE OR BOTH OF THEM MAY BE RETIRED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS.


-------------- --------------
MOST OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS ARE ALMOST INVISIBLE
-------------- --------------


21. (C) IN A STRIKING ILLUSTRATION OF HOW HIDDEN IS MUCH OF
THE PARTY'S INTERNAL WORK, MOST OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS
RARELY, IF EVER, APPEAR IN THE PRESS. DURING THE TWO MONTHS
OF OUR TRACKING, FOUR MEMBERS -- THOSE IN CHARGE OF THE
PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING, PERSONNEL ISSUES,
INVESTIGATION OF PARTY INFRACTIONS, AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS --
EITHER NEVER APPEARED OR APPEARED ONLY ONCE IN PROMINENT
MEDIA SUCH AS "NHAN DAN." INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP IS FORMER
HCMC PARTY CHIEF SANG, WHO DROPPED OFF THE SCREEN AFTER HE
WAS NAMED HEAD OF THE PARTY'S ECONOMIC COMMISSION. THIS IS
A GRAPHIC EXAMPLE OF HOW SECRETIVE ARE THESE SUPREMELY
POWERFUL OFFICIALS -- AND HOW SHELTERED FROM THE PUBLIC ARE
THEIR ACTIVITIES AND VIEWS. TO THE PUBLIC, MOST OF THEM ARE
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 07 OF 10 260851Z
CIPHERS AT BEST, AND YET THESE LEADERS SHAPE VIETNAM'S
NATIONAL POLICIES.


22. (C) LONG-TIME HEAD OF THE HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY
NGUYEN DUC BINH, AT AGE 72 ONE OF THE OLDEST POLITBURO
MEMBERS, NEVER APPEARED IN "NHAN DAN" OR OTHER PROMINENT
OFFICIAL PRESS FOR THE EIGHT-WEEK PERIOD WE MONITORED. THIS
IS STRIKING, BECAUSE SOME SOURCES IN HANOI SUGGEST BINH,
SEVENTH IN CPV RANKS, PLAYED A LARGE ROLE IN LEADING THE
OPPOSITION TO SIGNING THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT (BTA)
WITH THE U.S. AFTER THE BTA WAS INITIALED IN JULY 1999.
BINH HAS CLOSE CONNECTIONS TO MANY OF THE POLITBURO, SINCE
SENIOR CPV LEADERS PASS THROUGH THE ACADEMY FOR SENIOR
TRAINING. THUS, THOUGH VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE TO PUBLIC VIEW,
BINH EXERCISES SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE THROUGH HIS LINKS TO
HIS FORMER STUDENTS. BECAUSE OF HIS AGE, WE BELIEVE BINH
WILL RETIRE AT THE PARTY CONGRESS. (SOME SOURCES SUGGEST
ONE POSSIBLE CANDIDATE TO REPLACE BINH COULD BE PARTY
SPOKESMAN DAO DUY QUAT, WHO HAS ASSUMED HIGHER A PROFILE IN
THE CONFIDENT MANNER HE GIVES PUBLIC BRIEFINGS ON RECENT
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS. QUAT, WHOSE LATE FATHER SERVED
IN THE POLITBURO, MAY HAVE THE PATRONAGE OF LE DUC ANH,
ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES.)


23. (C) NGUYEN VAN AN, HEAD OF THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATION
DEPARTMENT, IS ANOTHER ENIGMA IN THE LEADERSHIP. RANKED
EIGHTH, AN APPEARED ONLY ONE TIME IN THE PRESS IN TWO
MONTHS, WHEN HE RECEIVED A DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS FROM
CHINA. INTERESTINGLY, AN WAS THE LEADING ALTERNATIVE TO
PHIEU IN THE DECEMBER 1997 VOTING AMONG THE POLITBURO FOR
GENERAL SECRETARY. IN A HIGHLY UNUSUAL, CLOSE SPLIT VOTE IN
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 07 OF 10 260851Z
THE POLITBURO, PHIEU WAS SELECTED AS GENERAL SECRETARY.
SINCE THAT TIME, THE PUBLIC HAS HEARD OR SEEN VIRTUALLY
NOTHING OF AN FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS. PARTICULARLY BECAUSE
OF HIS CHALLENGE TO PHIEU TWO YEARS AGO, HE IS A STRONG
CANDIDATE TO BE REPLACED ON THE POLITBURO.


24. (C) NGUYEN THI XUAN MY, CHAIRPERSON OF THE PARTY'S
COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION AND RANKED 10TH, ALSO RARELY
APPEARS IN PUBLIC OR IN THE PRESS. DURING THE TWO-MONTH
PERIOD SHE WAS FEATURED IN THE PRESS ONCE, LEADING A
CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC COMPLAINTS IN HO CHI MINH CITY. WE SEE
NO INDICATION SHE HAS SIGNIFICANT CLOUT IN THE POLITBURO.
THE FIRST FEMALE POLITBURO MEMBER, SHE WAS APPOINTED IN
1996, AND SOME COMMENTATORS BELIEVE SHE WAS APPOINTED BY THE
PARTY SO IT CAN CLAIM THERE IS NOT A "GLASS CEILING" IN THE
LEADERSHIP RANKS. (VIETNAM'S OTHER HIGHEST-RANKING WOMAN IS
VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN THI BINH, A WAR HEROINE, WHO EVEN MORE
THAN PRESIDENT LUONG HAS PRIMARILY CEREMONIAL DUTIES.)


25. (C) TRUONG TAN SANG, CURRENTLY HEAD OF THE CPV'S
COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND RANKED 11TH, WENT FROM
HAVING A VERY HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE AS PARTY LEADER IN HO CHI
MINH CITY TO BEING ALMOST INVISIBLE IN HIS CURRENT POSITION.
DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD SANG WAS NOT FEATURED AT ALL IN
PROMINENT VIETNAMESE MEDIA SUCH AS "NHAN DAN." AN ENGAGING
AND GREGARIOUS POLITICIAN CUT IN A MORE WESTERN MODE, SANG
WAS THOUGHT HIGHLY OF BY THE FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN
HCMC DURING HIS TENURE THERE, AND HE HAS BEEN SEEN FOR SOME
TIME AS A POTENTIAL RISING STAR AMONG THE MORE TECHNOCRATIC
"REFORMERS" IN THE PARTY. SOME CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC
COMMISSION AS A BACKWATER WITHOUT MAJOR CLOUT, ALTHOUGH
OTHERS WHO HAVE HELD THIS POSITION, SUCH AS FIRST DEPUTY PM
DUNG, HAVE EMERGED FROM THIS POSITION TO GREATER PROMINENCE.
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IS THAT SANG IS IN A HOLDING PATTERN
AND IS BEING WATCHED BY THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN HIS CURRENT
POSITION, WITH AN EYE TO POSSIBLE FUTURE PROMOTION -- OR
CAREER STAGNATION IF HE FALLS OUT OF FAVOR WITH MORE
CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE LEADERSHIP.


26. (C) LE XUAN TUNG, WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR
IDEOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND RANKS 12TH, LIKEWISE MOVED INTO THE SHADOWS AFTER BEING
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 08 OF 10 261124Z
REPLACED AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE HANOI PARTY. DURING THE TWO-
MONTH PERIOD TUNG WAS FEATURED IN "NHAN DAN" SIX TIMES --
ATTENDING NATIONAL CONFERENCES FOR JOURNALISTS AND WRITERS
AND A CONFERENCE ON IDEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL WORK, CHAIRING
A PLENUM BRIEFING AT THE HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY, AND
MEETING WITH CPV ETHNIC MINORITY CADRE. WE HAVE REPORTS
THAT TUNG IS IN ILL HEALTH, AND DURING HIS TENURE AS HANOI
PARTY LEADER, THE CITY'S PARTY AND PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE,
PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, WERE CRITICIZED STRONGLY BY CENTRAL
COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND IN THE PRESS FOR MISMANAGEMENT AND
CORRUPTION. (TUNG'S REPLACEMENT BY TRONG PUT A FIRM
IDEOLOGICAL ADVOCATE AT THE HELM.) WE EXPECT TUNG MAY BE
DROPPED FROM THE POLITBURO NEXT YEAR.


27. (C) PHAM THANH NGAN, DIRECTOR OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) AND RANKED
15TH, APPEARS TO BE, WITH TRONG, ONE OF THE RISING
IDEOLOGICAL STARS OF THE CPV. LIKE PHIEU AND TRONG, NGAN
APPEARS TO FAVOR A CAUTIOUS, INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO REFORM
THAT EMPHASIZES POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY. AS
POLITICAL COMMISSAR FOR THE MILITARY, NGAN OCCUPIES THE
POSITION PREVIOUSLY HELD BY PHIEU, WHO HAS RISEN TO THE TOP.
HE PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS PHIEU'S DEPUTY. NGAN WAS FEATURED
FIVE TIMES DURING THE TWO MONTHS -- ATTENDING THE MILITARY
FUNERAL OF GEN. NGUYEN BINH MARCH 12, PARTICIPATING IN AN
ARMY MEETING ON MASS MOBILIZATION AND IN THE NATIONAL
WRITERS' CONFERENCE, AND ATTENDING A TWO-DAY REVIEW MEETING
OF THE ARMED FORCES' FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN. ACCORDING TO
AN EDITOR AT THE "PEOPLE'S ARMY" NEWSPAPER, NGAN AT ONE TIME
WAS PUSHED BY PHIEU TO REPLACE DUYET ON THE STANDING
COMMITTEE, THOUGH A CONSENSUS WAS NOT REACHED AND NOW IT
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 08 OF 10 261124Z
APPEARS MORE LIKELY TRONG WILL MOVE INTO THAT POSITION.
NONETHELESS, NGAN LIKELY WILL CONTINUE TO RISE IN PARTY
RANKS, GIVEN HIS PERSONAL BACKING FROM PHIEU.


28. (C) PHAN DIEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE CPV IN DANANG, WHO IS
RANKED 17TH, PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DIRECTOR OF THE ECONOMIC
COMMISSION. SINCE BECOMING HEAD OF THE DANANG PARTY, DIEN
HAS BEEN FEATURED IN "NHAN DAN" ONLY TWICE -- FOR CEREMONIAL
OCCASIONS RELATED TO THE "LIBERATION" OF DANANG IN 1975,
SHORTLY BEFORE THE FALL OF SAIGON. HOWEVER, WE MUST NOTE
THAT FOR THIS PROJECT WE ARE NOT TRACKING THE LOCAL PAPERS
IN DANANG; DIEN'S PROFILE NO DOUBT IS MUCH HIGHER IN THE
CENTRAL REGION OF THE COUNTRY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE
DANANG PARTY POST HAS BEEN GIVEN ENHANCED RESPONSIBILITIES
WITH OVERSIGHT OVER THE ENTIRE CENTRAL REGION, ESPECIALLY
MANAGING THE RECOVERY OF THE SIX CENTRAL PROVINCES AROUND
DANANG THAT WERE MOST DAMAGED BY THE HEAVY FLOODS OF
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1999. THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR NOTED HE
WAS IMPRESSED WITH DIEN'S RELATIVE OPENNESS, CANDOR AND
COMMAND OF HIS BRIEF WHEN HE MET HIM SHORTLY AFTER DIEN'S
APPOINTMENT IN DANANG.

-------------- --------------
SENIOR ADVISORS' PUBLIC PROFILES DO NOT MATCH PRIVATE POWER
-------------- --------------



29. (C) THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS TO THE CPV -- FORMER
GENERAL SECRETARY DO MUOI, FORMER PRESIDENT LE DUC ANH, AND
FORMER PRIME MINISTER VO VAN KIET -- EACH CONTINUE TO BE
FEATURED IN THE PRESS, WITH KIET AND MUOI PARTICULARLY
KEEPING ACTIVE SCHEDULES OF PUBLIC EVENTS. HOWEVER, IN A
STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE DIVERGENCE OF PUBLIC ROLES AND
PRIVATE POWER AMONG THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, AT THE
PRESENT MOMENT THE LESS PROMINENT THE FIGURE, THE MORE
INFLUENCE HE HAS. THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAVE SEEN THE
REEMERGENCE OF LE DUC ANH ON THE SCENE AS A STRONG POLITICAL
FORCE. DURING THE PAST MONTHS, ANH HAS WORKED WITH PHIEU,
WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED UNDER ANH IN THE CAMBODIAN MILITARY
CAMPAIGN OF THE 1980'S, TO RESHUFFLE POLITBURO PORTFOLIOS,
TO DISCIPLINE SEVERAL ALLIES OF PM KHAI, AND TO GENERALLY
IMPOSE A MORE IDEOLOGICAL LINE ON CPV DECISION-MAKING. YET
ANH RARELY APPEARS IN THE PRESS, AND WHEN HE DOES, IT IS
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 09 OF 10 261124Z
USUALLY ONLY FOR CEREMONIAL OCCASIONS, WITHOUT A LOT OF
SUBSTANCE ATTACHED. MEANWHILE, KIET, WHO HAS THE HIGHEST
PROFILE, APPEARS TO HAVE THE LEAST INFLUENCE ON THE
POLITBURO.


30. (C) DURING THE TWO-MONTH PERIOD ANALYZED, ANH WAS
FEATURED ONLY THREE TIMES IN STATE-RUN PRINT MEDIA --
ATTENDING THE MARCH 25 JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE;
BEING PICTURED, CUSTOMARILY, IN THE FRONT ROW FOR THE
OPENING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM APRIL 10; AND
ATTENDING ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS OF THE "LIBERATION" OF
HCMC. THESE BRIEF MENTIONS GIVE HARDLY ANY CLUE OF ANH'S
INFLUENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP, SINCE WE HAVE CLEAR INDICATIONS
HE EXERTS SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE POLITBURO FROM BEHIND
THE SCENES. (COMMENT: IN LARGE PART ANH'S LOWER PROFILE MAY
REFLECT HIS RETICENCE FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES AS WELL AS
HEALTH CONCERNS. A YEAR AGO ANH WAS REPORTED TO BE IN VERY
POOR HEALTH, AND SOME HANOI OBSERVERS SPECULATED HE MIGHT
NOT LIVE MUCH LONGER. WHILE HE HAS RECOVERED ENOUGH TO
PARTICIPATE IN A LIMITED SCHEDULE, WE SPECULATE HE MAY
INTENTIONALLY BE LIMITING HIS SCHEDULE. END COMMENT.)


31. (C) CONTRAST, DO MUOI APPEARED 10 TIMES IN THE PRESS.
HE ATTENDED THE SAME THREE EVENTS AS ANH, AND HE VISITED A
MILITARY UNIT, A GARMENT COMPANY, AND A TRADE FAIR. HE ALSO
ATTENDED A CELEBRATION OF THE TRUNG SISTERS FROM VIETNAM'S
MILLENNIUM-LONG STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CHINESE, AND MET WITH
THE VISITING HEAD OF JAPAN-VIETNAM CULTURAL EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION. LIKEWISE, FORMER PRIME MINISTER KIET ALSO
MAINTAINED AN ACTIVE SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, BEING FEATURED IN
THE PRESS ON 11 DIFFERENT DAYS. KIET HELD MEETINGS WITH
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PAGE 04 HANOI 01160 09 OF 10 261124Z
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE YOUTH UNION, THE TRANSPORTATION
MINISTRY, AND THE NATIONAL STEEL COMPANY. UNLIKE ANH AND
MUOI, KIET KEPT AN ACTIVE TRAVEL SCHEDULE, VISITING AT LEAST
NINE SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL PROVINCES. KIET VISITED NATURE
PRESERVES IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF CA MAU, CAN THO, DONG
THAP AND DONG NGAI; MET WITH REPS OF THE VIETNAM COAL
COMPANY IN QUANG NINH; AND VISITED AN IRRIGATION PROJECT IN
BEN TRE. HE WAS THE ONLY ONE OF THE SENIOR ADVISORS TO
ATTEND THE LIBERATION OF DANANG CELEBRATIONS, AND HE
ATTENDED THE OPENING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM IN
HANOI (THOUGH HE WAS NOT PICTURED IN "NHAN DAN," AS WERE
MUOI AND ANH). (COMMENT: AS ONE OF THE SOUTHERNERS MOST
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADVANCING "DOI MOI" ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
VIETNAM OVER THE PAST DECADE, KIET TODAY SEEMS LIKE A SEMI-
RETIRED POLITICIAN PREACHING HIS GOSPEL ON THE BANQUET
CIRCUIT. THOUGH HE HAS LESS CLOUT ON NATIONAL POLICY AT
PRESENT BECAUSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE TILT OF THE LEADERSHIP,
HE CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY ESTEEMED IN THE SOUTH AND CENTER
OF THE COUNTRY. END COMMENT.)

-------------- --------------
WORKING IN THE SHADOWS, LARGELY HIDDEN FROM THE PUBLIC
-------------- --------------


32. (C) COMMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES
OF THE POLITBURO REVEALS HOW HIDDEN ARE THE WORKINGS OF THIS
SUPREME LEADERSHIP BODY. NEARLY HALF OF THE LEADERS ARE
VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE, AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE KNOWS LITTLE OF
THEM FROM THE STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA. (AND EVEN FOR THOSE
FEATURED MORE OFTEN IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS, THERE IS NARY A
CRITICAL WORD ABOUT CURRENT POLITBURO MEMBERS.) OTHERS IN
THE POLITBURO, ESPECIALLY THE STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND
THE PROVINCIAL PARTY CHIEFS, HAVE MANY MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO
"RUB SHOULDERS" WITH VIETNAMESE PRIVATE CITIZENS, AND THEIR
TRAVELS AND CONSTITUENT MEETINGS NO DOUBT PROVIDE SOME
MEASURE OF "GROUNDING" FOR THEM TO LEARN OF POPULAR
ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS. HOWEVER, IN THE LENINIST POLITICAL
STRUCTURE OF VIETNAM, THERE IS NO MEANS BY WHICH THE PARTY
LEADERSHIP IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE. WITHIN
THIS CONSENSUS-ORIENTED BODY, THE DEBATE ON REFORM HAS BEEN
GROUND TO A HALT BY ITS STYLE OF GOVERNANCE BASED ON THE
LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR. WESTERN OBSERVERS LOOKING AT
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PAGE 03 HANOI 01160 10 OF 10 261125Z
VIETNAM TODAY YEARN FOR ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MORE PRAGMATIC,
REFORM-MINDED YOUNGER LEADERS -- SUCH AS DUNG, SANG OR TRIET
-- TO STEP FORWARD AND IMPLEMENT A NEW ROUND OF RE-ENERGIZED
"DOI MOI" REFORMS. HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL WINDS ARE NOT
BLOWING THAT WAY IN HANOI TODAY, AND WE BELIEVE IT MORE
LIKELY THIS CAUTIOUS, CONSENSUS-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP WILL OPT
FOR MORE INCREMENTAL MUDDLING THROUGH. ULTIMATELY, FOR MOST
IF NOT ALL OF THE SENIOR LEADERS, THEIR PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE
IS MAINTAINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL
POWER FOR AS LONG AS THE GAME WILL PLAY. END COMMENT.
PETERSON

CONFIDENTIAL